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In  this  paper  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  is  analyzed  within  the  context  of  an  endogenous  growth 
and  cycles  model.  The  investigation  shows  the  different  situations  in  which  government 
expenditure  can  lead  to  both  crowding-in  and  crowding-out  of  output  and  employment.  With 
regard  to  the  cycle,  an  increase  in  the  Aure  of  government  spending  leads  to  an  expansion  of 
output  which  is  given  a  greater  stimulus  with  a  higher  degree  of  monetization.  Expansionary 
monetary  policies  accompanying  the  fiscal  expansion  tend  to  make  the  upswing  longer  and  the 
downswing  more  shallow,  i.e.  the  cycle  becomes  more  asymmetric.  The  medium-run  dynamics 
of  the  model  along  its  warranted  growth  path  essentially  rest  on  the  relative  movements  of 
business  retained  earnings  (i.e.  the  private  savings  rate  since  household  savings  are  ignored)  and 
the  government  spending  share.  With  the  private  savings  rate  fixed,  a  rise  in  the  government 
spending  share  leads  to  medium-run  crowding-out.  On  the  other  hand  if  policies  such  as 
investment  tax  credits,  lower  rates  of  corporate  taxation,  and  accelerated  deductions  for  capital 
depreciation  stimulate  the  growth  of  the  business  retained  earnings  then  an  increase  in  the 
govemment  spending  share  may  either  not  have  any  effect  on  the  warranted  path  or  may  even 
raise  it,  i.e.  there  might  be  crowding-in.  Moreover,  abstracting  from  any  changes  in  retained 
earnings,  an  increase  in  the  level  of  government  spending  produces  an  expansionary  cyclical 
effect  with  no  medium-run  crowding-out.  Finally,  the  model  exploits  the  empirical  finding  that 
infrastructure  investment  by  the  government  lowers  business  costs.  This  relationship  is  used  to 
demonstrate  that  the  warranted  growth  path  can  be  increased  via  a  shift  from  government 
consumption  expenditures  to  infrastructure  investment.  In  contrast  to  mainstream  analyses  these 
complex  results  imply  that,  within  limits,  the  state  has  a  number  of  policy  levers  at  its  disposal  to 
regulate  output  and  employment. I.  Introdktion 
In  this  paper  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  is  investigated  within  the  context  of  the  classical 
growth  and  cycles  (CGC)  model  developed  in Moudud  (1998)  which  is  an  extension  of  Shaikh 
(1990,  1996a,  1996b).  Given  its  particular  characteristics  with  respect  to  endogenous  growth 
and  cycles,  business  debt  dynamics,  and  assumptions  about  short-  and  medium-run  capacity 
utilization,  this  paper  will  demonstrate  how  the  patterns  produced  by  the  CGC  model  differ  from 
the  existing  macroeconomic  literature.  It  will be  shown  that  the  policy  implications  are  also 
somewhat  distinct  from  this  literature. 
An  overview  of  the  literature  on  fiscal  policy  reveals  a  variety  of  results  that  correspond 
to  the  different  schools  of  thought.  We  begin  with  a  pure  neoclassical  model  which  starts  by 
assuming  till  employment  output  (McCafferty,  1990).  An  increase  in  government  deficit 
spending,  financed  by  taxation  or  borrowing  from  the  public,  lowers  the  national  savings  rate  and 
therefore  the  growth  rate  of  investment  and  output.  In  this  way,  increased  public  sector 
consumption  in  the  present  is  financed  though  decreased  future  consumption.  Another  way  of 
making  this  argument  is  to  say  that  deficits  financed  by  borrowing  lead  to  a  rise  in  interest  rates 
which  in  turn  crowd  out  private  investment. 
The  neoclassical  approach  to  crowding-out  can  be  formally  shown  as  follows.  The  point 
of  departure  is  the  full  employment  level  of  output  Ysf.  If  Cd and  I,, are  consumption  and 
investment  demands  respectively  and  (G  -  T)  is  the  budget  deficit  then,  assuming  full  general 
equilibrium  Aggregate  Demand  =  Aggregate  Supply 
1.  Y‘i=Y;=>Cd+Id+(G-‘I)=Y; 
Let  consumption  be  some  fixed  proportion  c  of  output  so  that  Cd =  cYz  then 
2.  Id+(G-T)=Y;-  cY; 
so  that 
3.  Id+(G-T)=;Ysf 
where  the  savings  propensity  is  fixed  by  assumption.  Then  a  rise  in  the  /eve1 of  (G  -  T)  leads  to  a fall  in  the  ZeveZ  of  investment  Id.  If  the  above  equation  is  written  in  terms  of  shares  of  full 
employment  output  we  get 
4.  -J&Z  (G-T)  =; 
Ysf  Ysf 
Therefore  a  rise  in  the  government  deficit  she  (g  -  t)  =  (G  -  T)/Yi  leads  to  a  fall  in  the 
investment  share  ad =  &,Nsf.  Thus  the  model  produces  a  crowding-out  in  shares  because  of  a 
f  crowding-out  in  levels,  given  full  employment  output  Ys .  This  line  of  reasoning  in  terms  of 
shares  of  output  forms  the  basis  of  Feldstein’s  analysis  of  budget  deficits  (Feldstein,  1992).  The 
significance  of  the  difference  between  levels  and  shares  will become  evident  once  we  investigate 
fiscal  policy  within  the  context  of  the  CGC  model. 
McCafherty  (1990)  also  shows  that  government  spending,  however  financed,  entails  in 
long  run  equilibrium  a  rise  in  the  price  level  and  a  rise  in the  interest  rate.  The  reason  for  the 
latter  is  that  the  level  of  investment  is  considered  to  be  inversely  related  to  the  interest  rate.  Thus 
the  increase  in  aggregate  demand  at  full  employment  which  leads  to  a  fall  in  investment  demand 
can  only  result  from  a  rise  in  the  interest  rate. 
In  contrast  to  the  general  equilibrium model,  the  ISLM  model  relaxes  the  full  employment 
assumption  in  the  short  run  (Blinder  and  Solow,  1973; Demberg,  1989).  This  allows  fiscal  policy 
to  have  a  positive  impact  on  output  in  the  short  run.  The  model  shows  that  an  increase  in 
government  expenditure,  or  a  decrease  in  the  taxation  rate,  creates  a  multiplier  effect  of  spending 
that  stimulates  output  and  employment.  By  the  same  token  there  is  a  multiple  reduction  of 
spending  with  the  opposite  fiscal  policies.  At  or  beyond  full  employment,  the  “pumping”  effect 
of  the  government  deficit  becomes  inflationary. 
Rational  expectations  models  following  Barro  (1974)  emphasize  the  poZicy 
inefictiveness  of  budget  deficits  since  rational  private  agents  adjust  their  private  savings  rate 
sP to  compensate  for  the  higher  budget  deficit  so  as  to  be  able  to  pay  for  higher  future  taxation. 
This  ensures  that  the  social  savings  rate  s* =  sP +  (t  -  g)  remains  fixed  over  time. 
This  said,  there  is  however  now  a  growing  literature  in  the  mainstream  (Aschauer,  1989a, 
1989b,  1998)  that  uses  marginal  productivity  theory  and  rational  expectations  models  to  highlight 
2 the  possible  positive  effects  of  various  types  of  government  expenditures  even  at  full 
employment.  This  literature  focuses  specifically on  the  composition  of  government  spending  and 
demonstrates  the  positive  feedback  effects  on  growth  of  government  investment  in  infrastructure. 
Note  that  beginning  at  least  with  Domar  (1944),  non-mainstream  authors  such  as  Bernstein  and 
Heilbroner  (1991)  and  others  have  also  recognized  the  positive  effects  on  growth  and 
employment  of  public  investments  in  infrastructure  and  education. 
In  general,  in  the  non-mainstream  Keynesian  literature  the  system  has  sufficient  flexibility 
to  respond  positively  to  fiscal  injections.  This  is  in  contrast  to  neoclassical  models  in  which  the 
economy  is  rigidly  pinned  at  the  full  employment  level.  The  models  of  Tobin  (Tobin,  1980; 
Tobin  and  Buiter,  1980)  Godley  (Godley  and  Cripps,  1983;  Godley  and  Milberg,  1994;  Godley, 
1998),  and  Taylor  (1985,  1991)  allow  for  a  variety  of  mechanisms  to  derive  both  crowding-in 
and  crowding-out  effects  from  fiscal  policy.  As  is  standard  in the  macroeconomic  literature,  all 
three  authors  begin  with  the  short-run  equality  of  investment  and  savings,  I  =  S,  which  defines  a 
level  of  output  so  that  growth  is  a  long-run  phenomenon  determined  by  exogenous  factors  such 
as  fiscal  policy.  All  three  authors  allow  for  substantial  excess  capacity  and  unemployment.  In  the 
case  of  Tobin,  however,  the  long  run  is  characterized  by  full  employment  at  the  natural  growth 
rate  whereas  Taylor  (1985)  explicitly  argues  that  his  stagnationist  model  faces  persistent  excess 
capacity.  It  is  within  this  context  that  these  authors  use  portfolio  choice  theory,  infIation 
dynamics  and  the  Tobin  effect  (Tobin,  1980;  Tobin  and  Buiter,  1980;  Taylor,  1985,  1991)  the 
effects  of  fiscal  policy  on  income  distribution,  effective  demand,  intlation,  and  the  profit  rate 
(Taylor,  1985,  1991)  and  the  notion  of  the  fiscal  stance  and  wealth  effects  (Godley,  1998)  to 
analyze  the  impact  of  government  spending.  As  with  Blinder  and  Solow  (1973)  these  authors  do 
not  distinguish  between  level  and  shares  of  government  spending’.  Tobin  and  Taylor  in  particular 
use  these  various  mechanisms  to  derive  both  crowding-in  and  crowding-out  from  government 
expenditures.  These  ambiguous  theoretical  results  are  consistent  with  the  international  studies 
carried  out  by  WIDER  on  the  impact  of  budget  deficits.  As  Taylor  (1988)  summarizes,  these 
country  studies  show  that  deficits  can  have  both  positive  and  negative  effects  on  output  and 
employment.  Thus  the  reality  is  more  complex  than  the  simple  neoclassical  model  outlined 
‘Taylor  (1985,  1991) does  write  all  variables  in  terms  of  shares  but  does  not  investigate the  different  implications 
of  changes  in  levels  and  changes  in  shares  of  government  spending. 
3 above. 
To  recapitulate  the  discussion  in  Moudud  (I 998)  the  CGC  model  integrates  sectoral 
incomes,  expenditures,  and  finance  requirements  into  an  ex  unte  social  accounting  matrix  (SAM). 
Investment  in  circulating  capital,  bank  credit  to  finance  accumulation,  and  the  negative  feedback 
effect  of  debt  are  at  the  core  of  the  dynamical  system  and  form  the  basis  of  its  cycles.  The 
jimdzmenta~  equation  offinance  is  central  to  the  model’s  growth  properties: 
5.  e=(ac+q-s)+(g-t)=m-md=(Q+dB)-md 
where  e  =  excess  demand  in the  market  for  goods  and  services  and  is  a  key  cyclical  variable,  ac = 
investment  in  circulating  capital  (raw  materials  and  labor),  +  =  fixed  capital  investment,  s  = 
savings  propensity  (essentially  business  retained  earnings),  (g  -  t)  =  budget  deficit  share,  rns = 
money  supply,  Q  =  money  creation  from  the  budget  deficit,  dB =  bank  credit,  and  rnd =  buffer 
stock  demand  for  money.  In  the  general  case  s  =  business  retained  earnings  s,, +  household 
savings  rate  s,,.  However,  in  this  paper  we  abstract  from  household  savings  to  emphasize  the 
tindamental  role  of  profitability  in  the  regulation  of  business  investment  decision  in  the  classical 
tradition.  This  link between  retained  earnings  and  investment  is  central  to  the  CGC  model  and  is 
consistent  with  the  empirical  work  of  Fazzari  (1993)  and  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988). 
Such  an  approach  should  be  contrasted  with  the  neoclassical  macroeconomic  model  in  which  all 
of  the  real  net  income  of  the  business  sector  is  paid  out  to  households,  an  assumption  that 
generates  a  crucial  inconsistency  in  this  model  (Godley  and  Shaikh,  1998). 
The  growth  rate  of  output  is  related  to  investment  in  circulating  capital  via  the  Leontief 
input-output  coefficient  u: 
6.  P’ 
-P-=uac=p[e-ar+s-(g-t)] 
Investment  in  circulating  capital  is  positively  related  to  excess  demand  and  negatively  to  the 
finance  charges  on  bank  borrowing: 
I 
7.  aL=hie-hJ(1  +i)dn+(l  +i)?] 
4 Finally,  fixed  capital  investment  is  given  by 
8.  $k(u-u”)=k(u-  I) 
where  u,, is  normal  capacity  utilization  and  is  equal  to  1 by  construction.  If  d  =  s  - af  - (g  -  t)  then 
the  central  dynamical  system  is  captured  by  the  interplay  between  excess  demand,  circulating 
investment,  output  growth,  and  business  debt.  The  condition  e  =  0  traces  out  a  continuous  rate 
of  change  of  output  a  la  Harrod  (Kregel,  1980).  The  core  dynamical  system  is  represented  by  the 
following  nonlinear  differential  equation  system: 
9.  ai=hre-h2[(l  +i)dn+(l  +i)$] 
10.  dB’=(e’-h’+mi)+(l  +i)e+(pd-i)(e-dB-mG+mJ 
+  pe(e  -  dB -  h+  rnd) +  i(md -  Q) 
where  all  primes  denote  first  derivatives. 
The  medium  run  warranted  growth  path  is  regulated  by  the  normal  rate  of  profit  which  is 
determined  by  income  distribution  and  technology  (Kurz  and  Salvadori,  1995).  Thus 
any  factor  that  has  a  positive  effect  on  the  rate  of  profit  will  raise  the  growth  rate.  The 
examination  of  the  above  system  of  equations  should  provide  an  indication  of  the  complexities 
involved.  For  example,  equation  6  shows  that  a  rise  in  the  profit  margin  would  also  increase  the 
growth  rate  whereas  a  rise  in  the  budget  deficit  along  the  warranted  path  would  lower  it. 
Moreover,  if through  some  appropriate  policies  (as  discussed  by  Fazzari,  1993)  business  retained 
earnings  sP were  to  rise  faster  then  (g  -  t)  so  that  the  social  savings  rate  s* =  sP +  (t  -  g)  increases 
then  the  warranted  path  would  rise.  Furthermore,  since  capacity  utilization  is  an  endogenous 
variable  in  the  short  run  an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  tends  to  accelerate  output  relative  to  the 
trend  in  the&&  dynamic  (Moudud,  1998). 
The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  disentangle  these  “crowding-in”  and  “crowding-out”  effects, 
This  will  be  done  first  of  all by  partitioning  the  investigation  between  the  fast  dynamic  (or  short 
run)  and  the  slow  dynamic  (or  medium  run).  The  fast  dynamic  corresponds  to  the  equilibrating 
5 adjustment  between  aggregate  demand  and  supply  and  therefore  leads  to  the  empirically- 
observed  3-5  year  inventory  cycle.  Over  this  period,  the  rough  balance  between  aggregate 
demand  and  supply  traces  out  a  path  of  output  and  a  level  of  capacity  utilization  which  is  likely to 
be  different  from  normal.  Moreover,  investment  in the  share  of  circulating  capital  ac is  the 
immediate  consequence  of  aggregate  excess  demand  while  the  share  of  fixed  capital  Q  is  taken  as 
constant  in  the  fast  process.  Imbalances  between  actual  and  normal  capacity  provide  a  feedback 
signal  to  firms  which  adjust  their  investment  in  ar over  a  longer  time  period.  This  lo-11  year 
fixed  capital  cycle  involving  adjustments  in  capacity  utilization  and  constitutes  the  slow  dynamic. 
This  attainment  of  normal  capacity  over  the  longer-run  is  however  consistent  with  structural 
unemployment  as  Goodwin  (1967)  demonstrated  in  his  famous  growth  cycles  model. 
The  discussion  on  “crowding-out”  and  “crowding-in”  will  also  be  carried  out  by 
emphasizing  the  differences  between  static  and  dynamic  specifications  of  fiscal  policies  and, 
finally,  by  discussing  the  implications  for  the  warranted  path  of  the  difference  between  a  change 
in  the  ZeveZ  of  government  spending  from  a  change  in  its  composition,  i.e.  the  model  will 
distinguish  between  government  consumption  and  investment  expenditures.  It  will  exploit  the 
empirically-observed  result  that  infrastructure  investment  tends  to  lower  business  costs 
(Dalenberg  and  Eberts,  1992; Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1992;  Nadir-i and  Mamuneas,  1991). 
It  will be  shown  that  in  contrast  to  standard  dicussions  on  budget  deficits  (Rock,  1991)  the 
ambiguous  effects  of  fiscal  policy  along  with  structural  unemployment  allows  for  the  possibility 
of  some  combination  of  fiscal,  monetary,  and  industrial  policies  to  raise  the  growth  rate  in  the 
short-  and  medium-runs.  It  is  this  combination  of  policies  that  provides  the  rationale  for  an 
activist  state  to  regulate,  within  limits,  the  growth  of  output  and  employment. 
II.  The  Zmpact  of  Fiscal  Policy 
The  discussion  of  fiscal  policy  in  the  CGC  model  has  to  be  partitioned  into  an 
investigation  of  the  different  short-run  and  medium-run  effects,  as  well  as  the  distinctive  medium- 
run  effects  of  different  types  of  government  spending.  It  will  be  shown  that  the  composition  of 
government  spending  is  irrelevant  for  the  short-run  business  cycle  dynamics  but  becomes  very 
relevant  for  the  warranted  growth  rate.  However,  the  first  series  of  exercises  abstracts  from 
compositional  issues  so  as  to  provide  a  comparison  between  the  CGC  model  and  the  literature, 
6 most  of  which  assumes  government  consumption  expenditures. 
Before  starting  the  investigation  we  must  first  turn  to  the  issue  of  the  difference  between 
a  dynamic  and  a  static  specification.  We  now  turn  to  this  issue. 
a)  Mapping  between  Static  and  Dynamic  Model  Specifications 
As  in  Hat-rod (Kregel,  1980)  and  the  tradition  of  classical  economcs  spanning  the 
Physiocrats,  Marx’s  schemes  of  reproduction,  and  the  von  Neumann  growth  model  (Chakravarty, 
1989)  the  point  of  departure  of  the  CGC  model  is  a  continuous  rate  of  growth  of  output.  Thus 
any  investigation  of  fiscal  policy  has  to  differentiate  between  temporary  and  permanent  changes 
in  government  spending  (G)  reZative to  the  growth  path  of  output.  As  shown  in  Moudud  (1998) 
this  growth  path  does  not  depend  on  a  persistent  increase  in  government  spending  in  a  closed 
economy  since  it  is  driven  by  the  rate  of  profit,  the  quintessentially  classical  feature  of  model 
(Dumenil  and  Levy,  1993).  In  fact,  a  fall in  the  rate  of  profit  (Kleinknecht,  Mandel,  and 
Wallerstein,  1992)  would  lower  the  growth  rate. 
It  follows  therefore  that  in  a  dynamical  system,  there  is  a  difference  between  a  rise  in  the 
1eveZ  of  government  spending  G  from  a  rise  in  the  share  of  government  spending  g  =  G/P.  A 
one-time  increase  in  g  is  an  acceleration  of  G  relative  to  P  whereas  a  one-time  increase  in  G 
produces  a  pulse  in  g  which  eventually  dies  out:  each  of  these  fiscal  policies  has  a  different  effect 
on  the  system.  Thus  in  a  dynamical  context,  the  nature  of  the  fiscal  policy  needs  to  be  specified. 
Figure  1  maps  the  different  types  of  fiscal  policy  in  the  static  and  dynamic  cases.  Each 
figure  on  the  right  is  the  dynamic  equivalent  of  the  static  case  on  the  leti.  Based  on  this  figure  we 
see  that  a  staticpdse  (a jump  in  G  followed  by  a  fall to  the  initial level)  is  equivalent  to  a 
dynamic  spike;  a  static  jump  is  equivalent  to  a  @namic  pulse;  and,  finally, a  static  rise  is 
equivalent  to  a  @zamic  jump.  Generally,  the  fiscal  policy  literature  (for  example,  Blinder  and 
Solow,  1973)  is  based  on  the  static  pulse  scenario.  The  policy  implications  of  these  different 
fiscal  policy  regimes  are  also  likely to  be  different  as  the  subsequent  simulations  will  show. 
It  therefore  follows  that  in  a  mapping  of  the  dynamical  model  with  the  existing  literature 
(whose  point  of  departure  is  a  short-run  level  of  output)  it  is  important  to  ensure  that  the 
comparison  is  an  appropriate  one.  For  example,  in  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  an  increase  in 
government  spending  the  effect  of  a  rise  in  g  in  the  CGC  model  needs  to  be  compared 
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b)  The  Short-Run  or  Cyclical  Effects  of  Government  Spending 
Figures  2  and  3  show  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  g  on  the  business  cycle2.  Given  the 
taxation  rate,  these  figures  show  the  impact  of  an  increase  in the  budget  deficit.  Since  excess 
demand  is  the  key  signal  variable  faced  by  firms,  Figure  2  shows  that  a jump  in  this  variable, 
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Flgure  2.  The  Effect  of  a  Rise  in  the  Budget  Deficit  on  Excess  Demand  and 
Business  Debt 
caused  by  a jump  in  the  budget  deficit  share,  in turn  stimulates  the  demand  for  bank  credit. 
The  finance  charges  of  firms  accumulate  relative  to  their  cash  flow  over  time  and  this  tends  to 
have  a  gradually  negative  effect  on  accumulation. 
The  above  discussion  on  fiscal  policy  has  an  important  implication  for  monetary  policy. 
In  the  ISLM  model  a  rise  in  the  budget  deficit  leads  to  crowding-out  occurs  because  it  increases 
the  interest  rate  and  therefore  brings  about  a  fall in  investment  and  output  (Arestis,  1985).  The 
’  The next  section discusses the  effects of a  rise  in  G.  As  shown in  Figure 9,  a  rise  in  G  also produces a  short-run 
stimulus. 
9 upward-sloping  LM  curve  which  produces  this  result  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  money 
supply  is  vertical  and  exogenously  determined  and  that  the  money  demand  curve  is  downward- 
sloping  and  stable.  On  the  other  hand,  the  positive  effect  on  the  interest  rate  and  output  of  a  rise 
in  (G  -  T)  may  be  modulated  in the  ISLM  model  by  expansionary  monetary  policies  which  shift 
the  LM  curve  out  (Buiter,  1977).  In  contrast  to  the  pure  neoclassical  model,  this  flexibility exists 
in  the  ISLM  model  because  of  its  assumption  of  short-run  unemployment.  Once  it  reaches  till 
employment  output,  however,  expansionary  monetav  policies  have  no  real  effects  but  only  raise 
prices  (Dernberg,  1989; Krugman  and  Obstfeld,  1994). 
I-Iowever, the  positive  effect  on  the  interest  rate  of  a  deficit  increase  is  based  on  the 
interaction  between  narrow  money  demand,  a  fixed  money  supply,  and  the  bond  market.  The 
interest  rate  changes  via  the  demand  for  bonds,  where  the  unique  rate  of  interest  is  in  fact  the 
bond  rate.  In  this  scenario,  the  increased  supply  of  bonds  by  the  government  to  the  public 
(because  of  an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit)  can  only  take  place  by  a  lowering  of  bond  prices 
and  a  rise  in  the  equilibrium bond  interest  rate.  Moreover,  the  expansionary  effect  of  the  deficit 
raises  consumption  demand  and  therefore  raises  the  demand  for  money.  Given  a  fixed  money 
supply  the  interest  rate  rises. 
The  question  is,  how  is  the  interest  rate  affected  in the  CGC  model  when  the  budget 
defcit  rises?  For  the  purposes  of  this  comparison  we  will  cast  the  discussion  in  terms  of  “bonds” 
where  the  supply  of  credit  =  demand  for  “bonds”  by  banks  and  the  demand  for  credit  =  supply  of 
“bonds”  by  firms3.  In  the  CGC  model,  the  impact  of  a  rise  of  the  deficit  on  the  credit  market 
interest  rate  will  depend  on  banks’  desired  liquidity ratio  relative  to  their  actual  liquidity  ratio 
(Moudud,  1998).  Because  the  links  between  reserves  and  loans  is  a  flexible  one  in  this 
endogenous  money  model  (Wray,  1990; Pollin,  1991),  any  additional  supply  of  bonds  in  the 
credit  market  will  not  necessarily  raise  the  interest  rate  if banks  readily  demand  the  bonds.  This 
is  the  situation  when  their  desired  and  actual  liquidity  ratios  are  equal.  Thus  if banks  readily 
accommodate  the  demand  for  credit  and/or  the  central  bank  readily  supplies  banks  with  the 
necessary  reserves  there  will be  no  pressure  on  the  equilibrium  interest  rate.  This  is  in  fact  the 
horizontalist  view  of  the  interest  rate  (Moore,  1988). 
’  Quotes are used throughout  to Werentiate  the  credit market bonds from regnlar bonds. As  discussed, this  is 
becanse the  supply of the former is determined  by circumstances  that are particular to the banking sector. 
10 The  point  is  that  the  supply  of  credit  by  banks  expands  endogenously  and  is  not  reserve- 
constrained.  This  may  or  may  not  place  pressure  on  the  interest  rate.  In  contrast,  firms  and 
households  can  loan  money  only  upto  the  extent  of  their  savings.  Therefore,  whenever  the 
government  seeks  to  borrow  additional  funds  from  these  non-bank  private  sector  units  it  has  to 
raise  the  interest  rate  on  bonds  to  attract  the  fixed  savings  stock.  Of  course,  if  following  the 
money  multiplier  story  banks  are  “all loaned  up”  and  do  not  engage  in  reserve-economizing 
behavior  through  asset  and  liability management  (Moore,  1988;  Wray,  1990;  Palley,  1996)  then 
banks  too  will  be  like  other  firms  and  households,  i.e.,  any  additional  demand  for  loanable  funds 
with  a  fixed  supply  of  base  will  raise  the  interest  rate.  However,  f?om the  endogenous  money 
approach,  banks  are  different  in  terms  of  the  flexibility of  their  loan  capacity.  Thus  even  if  one 
were  to  treat  credit  as  a  bond,  its  supply  is  determined  by  circumstances  that  are  peculiar  to  the 
banking  sector. 
Suppose  we  consider  a  pure  bond-financed  increase  in the  budget  deficit.  In  this 
situation,  the  loan  rate  gets  an  upward  push  from  two  sources.  As  discussed  in  Moudud  (1998) 
the  credit  demandpuZZ  effect  will tend  to  raise  the  loan  rate  of  interest4.  Moreover,  the  floating 
of  the  government  bonds  also  raises  the  bond  rate  of  interest.  The  basic  point,  is  that,  if  as  a 
consequence  of  the  deficit  increase,  the  system’s  bond  supply  increases  relative  to  its  supply  of 
base,  there  will  be  a  rise  in  both  the  bond  rate  and  the  loan  rate.  The  “interest  rate”  which  is  the 
resultant  of  these  two  interest  rates  will rise.  However,  ceterisparibus,  an  increased  degree  of 
money-financing  of  the  deficit  will  attenuate  this  upward  push  on  the  interest  rate.  In  the  limit,  if 
the  Ziquidity  e#ect  (Moudud,  1998)  dominates,  the  interest  rate  will  fall.  Taylor  (1985)  also 
derives  such  an  ambiguous  link  between  the  budget  deficit  and  the  interest  rate  by  using  a 
different  set  of  mechanisms.  This  ambiguous  relationship  is  confirmed  empirically  (Arora  and 
Dua,  1993). 
The  next  exercise  shows  that  if  the  rise  in  the  budget  deficit  is  accompanied  by 
expansionary  monetary  policies,  there  will  be  downward  pressure  on  the  interest  rate  (that  is,  the 
liquidity  effect  will  dominate)  which  in  turn  will have  positive  a  effect  on  the  short-run  dynamics 
of  the  system.  Figure  3  shows  that  the  monetized  portion  of  the  deficitA&  (Burdekin  and 
’  This  happens because the  fiscal stimulus raises  investment demand and therefore the  demand for credit by firms 
to  Abel  the  positive excess demand. 
11 Langdana,  1992)  is  increased  where 
11.  A&=p(G-T) 
and  p  is  a  policy  parameter.  An  increase  of  this  parameter  Corn  PO  to  PI reveals  two  interesting 
features  of  the  short-run  dynamics.  First  the  budget  deficit  has  a  more  stimulating  effect.  This 
follows  fkom equation  5  in  which  a  rise  in  Q  increases  e  for  given  values  of  dB and  rnd. 
Moreover,  an  increase  in  the  degree  of  monetization  also  tends  to  make  the  business  cycle  more 
asymmetric,  i.e.  the  expansion  phase  is  prolonged  whereas  the  contraction  becomes  less  steep 
with  the  higher  value  of  /II. The  reason  for  this  asymmetry  is  due  to  a  lower  interest  rate  at  every 
point  of  the  cycle.  The  interest  rate  declines  because  of  the  increased  supply  of  high-powered 
money  into  the  system  from  the  higher  monetization. 
This  can  be  seen  fi-om the  following  equation  for  the  interest  rate  (Moudud,  1998): 
12.  di/dt  =  -j(q  -  rnd  =  -j(dB +  Q  -  mJ 
12 where  j  >  0.  In  other  words,  a  higher  value  of  Q  leads  to  a  lower  trend  for  the  interest  rate 
given  dB and  w  as  shown  in  Figure  4. 
The  fall in  the  value  of  the  interest  rate  in turn  lowers  the  finance  charges  faced  by  firms 
at  every  phase  of  the  cycle,  which  makes  the  expansion  more  pronounced  and  brings  about  a 
quicker  recovery  in  the  recession  period.  The  net  expansionary  effect  of  this  joint  combination  of 
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Figure  4.  The  Effect  on  the  Interest  Rate  of  Different  Degrees  of 
Monetization  of  the  Budget  Deficit 
fiscal  and  monetary  expansion  was  also  discussed  by  Buiter  (1977)  and  Nguyen  and  Turnovsky 
(1983)  although  in  an  ISLM  context. 
Finally,  Figure  5  shows  that  the  stimulus  provided  by  the  higher  deficit  leads  to  an 
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Figure  5.  The  Short-Run  Effect  of  a  Rise  in  g  on  the  Growth  Rate 
The  above  results  were  obtained  by  using  the  accumulation  reaction  function  represented 
by  equation  7  which  is  a  behavioral  relationship  that  shows  the  positive  and  negative 
determinants  of  circulating  investment.  Typically,  investment  equations  in  the  Keynes/Kalecki 
tradition  ignore  the  negative  feedback  effect  of  debt  (Taylor,  1985,  1991;  Palley,  1996;  Lavoie, 
1995),  a  curious  feature  of  these  models  given  that  they  emphasize  the  independence  of 
investment  from  savings  and  the  endogeneity  of  bank  credit. 
One  can  think  of  the  relative  magnitudes  of  hi  and  hZ as  an  indicator  of  the  relationship 
between  the  CCC  model  and  models  in  the  Keynes/Kalecki  tradition.  In  the  limit  as  hZ -->  0,  the 
system  begins  to  resemble  the  latter  group  of  models  (Taylor,  1985,  1991;  Palley,  1996)  since  the 
disciplining  effect  of  business  debt  on  investment  dies  off  progressively.  In  other  words,  bank 
credit  becomes  more  like  “freely  gotten  finance”  (Asimakopoulos,  1983,  pp.  223-227)  as  hZ -->  0 
so  that  there  is  a  positive  feedback  effect  only  between  excess  demand  and  investment.  This 
situation  is  the  short-run  analogue  of  the  Harrod-Domar  long-run  positive  feedback  loop 
between  the  level  of  capacity  utilization  and  its  rate  of  change.  Like  the  Harrod-Domar  model, 
this  positive  feedback  leads  to  knife-edge  instability  around  the  short-run  growth  path. 
14 However,  the  increase  in  private  debt  from  a  rise  in  the  budget  deficit  can  be  shown  to 
take  place  by  superimposing  a  central  result  of  Godley’s  Keynesian  macro-model  into  the  CGC 
model.  Godley  argues  on  empirical  grounds  that  the  flow  of  net  financial  assets  of  the  private 
sector,  ANFA,  is  a  stable  proportion  of  output  K so  that  K =  ANFAR  (Godley  and  Milberg, 
1994)  where 
13.  ANFA=S-I 
The  fundamental  equation  of  finance,  the  business  budget  restraint,  and  the  government  budget 
(Moudud,  1998)  are  respectively 
14.  E=M-Md 
15.  ADD =  I  -  [S  -  (AMd +ABN&] 
16.  G-T=AMG+ABNG 
where  A&  =  p(G  -  T).  Combining  these  three  equations  we  get 
17.  (S-I)=(G-T)-ADB-A&+AMd 
From  equations  16  and  13 
ANFA  ABNo  AMY  ADn 
18.  -z-+--- 
P  P  P  P 
Since  ABNG =  (1  -  p)(G  -  T)  it  follows  that 
19.  Kz(l  _P)(G-~)  k A”d  ADn 
P  P  P 
Therefore 
20. 
AMd  ADn 
(I  -p)(g-t)+T-y=K 
15 Assuming  for  simplicity that 
in  Shaikh  (1989)  then  from 
21.  Md =  rnJi)P 
we  get 
22.  Md=&P 
so  that 
the  interest  rate  is  held  constant’  via  some  “appropriate”  policies  as 
mAP  - 
23.  - 
P 
d?  =  md& 
Substituting  this  into  equation  20 
- 
24.  ADB 
(l  ~~)(g~t)+m~gr+---  =lC 
P 
In  Godley,  the  movement  from  one  steady  state  to  another  caused  by  an  increase  in  G  also 
implies  that  g  rises  in  the  transient  until  output  catches  up  with  G.  Thus,  given  the  tax  rate  t,  this 
implies  that  (g  -  t)  rises  temporarily.  A  rise  in  (g  -  t)  increases  output,  gp >  0,  in  the  transient. 
From  equation  24  we  see  that  given  the  stable  ratio  IC, an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  will  be 
accompanied  by  the  increase  flow  of  private  debt  ADJP.  In  other  words,  the  combination  of 
Godley’s  flow/flow  norm  along  with  the  business  budget  restraint  also  produces  an  increase  in 
the  flow  of  private  debt.  The  existing  Keynesian  literature  does  not,  however,  deal  with  the 
feedback  effect  of  this  debt  on  investment. 
c)  The  Medium-Run  Effects  of  Government  Spending 
We  next  turn  to  the  medium-run  effects  when  the  system  gravitates  around  normal 
capacity.  The  first  part  of  this  section  abstracts  from  composition  issues  and  assumes  that  all 
’  It  is  of  course  true  that  the  interest  rate  is  a  variable  in  the  CGC  model,  But  the  variation  of  the  interest  rate  is 
not  centraI  to  this  model,  Shaikh  (1989)  obtains  the  same  cyclical  dynamic  behveen  excess  demand  and  the  money 
supply by  holding  the  interest  rate  constant. 
16 government  spending  entails  expenditures  on  goods  and  services  and  wages,  i.e.  government 
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Figure  6.  The  Longer-Run  Effect  of  an  Increase  in  g  on  Output 
consumption  expenditures.  Thus  investments  in  infrastructure  and  capital  stock  are  abstracted 
from  initially although  the  effects  of  these  factors  are  considered  in  the  next  sub-section. 
i)  l7re Eflects  of  an  Increase  in  Goverment  Consumption  Expenditures. 
Figure  6  shows  that  a  rise  in  the  budget  deficit  share  leads  to  an  eventual  crowding-out 
output  and  employment.  This  is  shown  by  curve  A,  while  curve  B  corresponds  to  a  constant 
budget  deficit.  The  area  in  between  the  two  curves  represents  the  loss  of  long-run  output  and 
employment  caused  by  the  higher  deficit. 
The  above  crowding-out  result  can  be  demonstrated  in  the  following  way  from  an 
extension  of  a  Harrod-type  system.  If  W  =  wages,  Cc =  capitalists  consumption,  C.,  =  working 
class  consumption,  and  assuming  that  W  =  C,,, then 
of 
25.  W+P+T=(C+C,J+I+G 
26.  P=C+I+(G-T) 
17 where  I  is  fixed  capital  investment.  If  Y  =  output  then 
27.  $Z$!+  (GP-T)  +++++@+L) 
28.  s  P-L+  (G-T) 
cYY  Y 
where  the  savings  propensity  sC is  taken  to  be  constant.  In  other  words,  the  share  of  profits  in 
output  is  given  by 
Dividing  through  by  the  capital-output  ratio  K/Y 
P/Y  I/Y+(G-T)/Y  30.  -= 
s  WY 
Now  if  Y*  =  potential  output  and  capacity  utilization  u  =  Y/Y* then 
31.  K  KY*  K  -Z--Z- 
Y  Y*  Y  Y*u 
If  v  =  K/Y* and  is  taken  to  be  constant  then  combining  equations  28  and  29  we  get 
32.  r  = i  z  (;)[(+)  +  (GYT)] 
C 
Equation  32  is  important  to  the  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  the  classical  and  post- 
Keynesian  traditions.  Both  traditions  would  agree  that  in  the  short  run  capacity  utilization  can 
take  on  any  value,  as  determined  by  demand.  Then  a  rise  in  the  budget  deficit  share  (G  -  T)/Y 
will  raise  the  rate  of  profit  both  directly  and  indirectly  via  increased  capacity  utilization  and 
investment. 
The  distinction  between  the  two  traditions  arises  over  the  medium  to  long  run.  In  the 
classical  tradition  capacity  utilization  gravitates  around  normal  (u  =  u,,) and  the  corresponding 
18 normal  rate  of  profit  (r  =  rJ  is  given  by  technology  and  income  distribution.  Thus 
where  the  bars  indicate  that  r,, and  u,, are  given  exogenously  in the  medium  run.  Then  a  rise  in  the 
budget  deficit  share  can  only  be  accompanied  by  a  fall in  the  investment  share. 
The  crowding-out  result  in  the  CGC  model  ultimately  depends  on  what  is  assumed  about 
the  rate  of  profit  over  the  long  run.  Along  the  warranted  path 
34.  I  =  s  =  scP 
so  that  dividing  through  by  K 
35.  g  =  UK =  rsc 
or 
36.  r=g/sc 
The  classical  and  post-Keynesian  traditions  would  interpret  equation  36  in  two  different  ways. 
As  Km-z and  Salvadori  (1995)  argue,  in  the  classical  tradition  the  rate  of  profit  is  ultimately 
determined  by  technology  and  income  distribution  and  determines  investment  and  growth.  In  the 
post-Keynesian  view  as  advocated  by  Kaldor  and  Robinson,  it  is  the  rate  of  growth  which 
determines  investment  and  thus  the  rate  of  profit.  In  other  words  in  the  classical  view,  given  the 
profit-of-enterprise  (i.e.,  given  the  relative  rates  of  return  between  the  real  and  financial  sectors), 
there  cannot  be  a  “general  glut”  of  commodities  since  the  negative  effect  on  aggregate  demand  of 
an  increase  in  savings  would  be  exactly  compensated  by  the  positive  effect  of  additional 
investment.  Given  technology  and  wages,  ultimately  at  any  point  in  time  it  is  the  savings 
behavior  of  capitalists  (essentially  business  retained  earnings)  which  determines  investment  in 
subsequent  periods.  This  is  abler all  the  central  point  of  the  schemes  of  reproduction  and  the 
reason  why  growth  is  an  endogenous  feature  of  this  tradition.  In  the  post-Keynesian  tradition,  on 
the  other  hand,  growth  is  determined  by  the  state  of  demand  and  animal  spirits  so  that  aggregate 
demand  and  investment  can  be  pumped  up  to  different  levels  so  as  to  generate  the  profits  in  order 
19 to  make  investment  equal  to  savings.  Thus  the  rate  of  profit  is  the  residua1 variabie  and  growth  is 
exogenous. 
The  importance  of  savings  in  the  determination  of  the  long-run  path  of  accumulation  is 
explicitly  mentioned  by  Domar  who  argues  that  “[T]he  fall in  the  rate  of  growth  is  accompanied, 
or  rather  caused,  by  a  declining  propensity  to  save.  The  public  prefers  to  consume  a  greater 
share  of  its  income  today;  therefore,  a  smaller  percentage  is  invested,  and  income  cannot  grow  as 
fast  as  it  otherwise  would”,  (Domar,  1944,  p.  821).  Therefore,  “[Slince  government  absorbs  a 
part  of  savings,  it  is  of  course  desirable  that  its  expenditures  be  productive,”  (ibid.,  p.  820).  We 
will  turn  to  this  issue  of  productive  government  expenditures  and  its  effect  later  on  this  paper6. 
In  this  respect  Domar  is  of  course  following  the  view  of  the  classical  tradition  beginning  with  the 
Physiocrats  who  argued  that  certain  kinds  of  activities  such  as  government  spending  are  not 
surplus-producing  and  therefore  do  not  add  to  the  wealth  of  the  nation  since  they  constitute 
different  forms  of  social  consumption  (Eltis,  1993;  Shaikh  and  Tonak,  1994).  Thus,  compared 
to  the  neoclassical  model,  the  meaning  of  crowding-out  in  the  classical  tradition  is  different  since 
savings  have  a  different  meaning  in  the  latter.  As  Shaikh  and  Tonak  (1994)  discuss,  savings  in 
the  classical  tradition  arise  from  surplus  value  and  are  therefore  rooted  in  a  theory  of  value  and 
distribution  that  is  totallly  different  from  the  neoclassical  one. 
There  are  two  other  reasons  why  the  parallels  between  the  neoclassical  and  the  classical 
models  should  not  lead  one  to  conclude  that  the  mechanisms  involved  in  the  crowding-out  result 
are  the  same.  First,  in  the  CGC  model  the  long-run  normal  capacity  utilization  requirement  is 
consistent  with  structural  unemployment  as  Goodwin  (1967)  demonstrated  in  his  fmous  model. 
Second,  the  loanable  funds  theory  of  the  rate  of  interest  does  not  hold  in  the  classical  tradition 
(Rogers,  1989),  an  aspect  which  it  shares  with  the  post-Keynesian  tradition.  In  other  words,  it 
should  not  be  inferred  from  the  CGC  model  that  crowding-out  occurs  because  the  rise  in  the 
budget  deficit  raises  the  interest  rate.  In  fact,  as  discussed  above,  the  interest  rate  could  very 
wellfiZZ under  certain  circumstances  when  the  deficit  increases. 
’  Domar’s  model is somewhat  Merent  from that of Harrod in  that  it  emphasizes  the  full  employment 
growth  rate  of  the  system.  The  long-nm  growth  path  of  output  or  investment  are  positive  fimctions  of  the  savings 
rate  and  another  parameter  that  relates  the  rate  of  increase  of productive  capacity  to  investment  (Hacche,  1979; 
Asimakopoulos,  1986). 
20 How  does  the  system  respond  over  the  medium  run  when  capacity  utilization  fluctuates 
around  the  normal  level  and  q  is  a  variable?  The  medium-run  steady  state  value  of  q  (Shaikh, 
1989)  is 
where  rn is  the  normal  capacity  rate  of  profit  and  s* =  sP +  (g  -  t)  is  the  social  savings  rate.  This  is 
the  stable  value  of  4  when  u  =  1.  Equation  37  shows  that  a  fall  in  the  social  savings  rate  caused 
by  an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  leads  to  fall  in  ar in  the  medium  run.  Furthermore,  since  e  =  0 
in  the  medium  run, 
38.  <=S*  -Ff 
But  from  equation  37  the  steady  state  value  of  q  is  a  positive  function  of  s*.  Taking  partial 
derivatives  of  equation  3 8 
Since  0  -C $(u  +  r,,) <  1 it  follows  that 
aiT 
40.  o<  -.-L<] 
as* 
In  other  words,  if the  social  savings  rate  falls the  long-run  steady  state  value  of  aC will  also  fall. 
Thus  if  all  public  expenditure  is  of  the  unproductive  kind  then  aggregate  investment  will  fall  over 
the  long  run  when  the  budget  deficit  rises. 
For  a  number  of  reasons,  the  role  of  savings  in  the  classical  model  is  the  opposite  to  that 
in  the  Keynes/Kale&i  tradition.  Authors  in  this  tradition  have  argued  that  investment  is 
independent  of  savings  because  of  bank  credit.  While  it  is  certainly  true  that  bank  credit  partially 
liberates  planned  investment  spending  from  available  savings  in  the  short  run,  in  the  classical 
tradition  savings  out  of  business  profits  constitute  a  vital  source  of  long-run  investment.  This 
21 was  demonstrated  by  Marx  in the  schemes  of  expanded  reproduction  in  which,  given  the  rate  of 
profit,  higher  rates  of  accumulation  required  a  higher  savings  rate  to  finance  the  additional 
investment.  As  Eltis  (1993)  argues  this  is  a  feature  of  the  classical  tradition  that  has  its  roots  in 
Quesnay’s  Tableau  Economique. 
Given  this  different  approach  to  savings,  the  question  is  what  role  does  the  paradox  of 
thrifi  play  in  the  classical  tradition?  In  the  Keynes/Kale&i  tradition,  investment  is  determined 
exogenously  (Taylor,  1985,  1991).  Starting  with  S  =  I,  if the  savings  propensity  increases  so  that 
S  >  I  then  aggregate  demand  will  fall  since  consumption  demand  has  fallen  for  a  given  level  of 
investment.  This  is  the  paradox  of  thrifi.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  neoclassical  tradition  the  rise 
in  aggregate  savings  leads  to  a  fall in the  interest  rate  and  therefore  a  rise  in  investment  until 
savings  and  investment  are  equal  at  a  higher  level  of  output.  There  is  no  paradox  of  thrifi. 
The  above  two  results  may  be  summarized  in  term  of  the  excess  demand  relationship 
(assuming  that  the  budget  deficit  is  zero). 
41.  E=I-S=sP 
which  in  equilibrium  is 
42.  I-sP=O 
In  the  Keynes/Kalecki  tradition,  investment  is  fixed  exogenously  (I  = i)  so  that  a  rise  in  s  can  only 
be  accommodated  by  a  fdl  in  output.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  neoclassical  approach  output  is 
at  the  till  employment  level  (P  = F)  so  that  a  rise  s  must  be  accompanied  by  an  increase  in 
investment  to  fill the  gap.  Since  I  is  a  negative  fi.mction of  the  interest  rate,  the  latter  must  fall  to 
push  the  former  upwards. 
The  discussion  of  the  paradox  of  thrift  within  the  classical  context  needs  to  distinguish 
between  the  short-  and  medium-run  effects  of  a  rise  in  the  savings  rate  ‘.  Defining  s* =  s  +  (t  -  g) 
as  the  social  savings  rate 
43.  e=aC+ar-s*=q-md 
’  I  am  gratew  to  Anwar  Shaikh  for  discussions on  this  issue. 
22 where  +,  being  a  slowly  adjusting  variable,  is  assumed  to  be  constant  in  the  short  run.  Then  a 
rise  in  s” will  have  the  effect  of  making  e  c  0  and  q  <  rnd.  From  the  accumulation  reaction 
function  (equation  7)  ac will  fall, thereby  ensuring  that  both  the  growth  rate  and  level  of  output 
will  also  fall.  With  a  fixed  ar, the  level  of  fixed  investment  If will  also  drop,  In  another  words,  in 
the  short  run  a  rise  in  the  social  savings  rate  will  produce  a  paradox  of  thrill  scenario  by  lowering 
both  the  level  (I  =  Ic +  IJ  and  the  share  (a  =  ac +  aJ  of  private  investment.  Another  way  of 
putting  this  is  to  say  that  over  the  short  run,  a  rise  in  savings  leads  to  a  fall  in  effective  demand 
and  therefore  of  investment.  Given  the  role  of  demand  in  the  short  run  in  the  CCC  model,  this 
Keynes/Kale&i  type  of  result  is  not  surprising.  But  note  that  unlike  the  latter  literature,  the 
mechanism  in  the  former  is  different  and  moreover  entails  a  dynamic  disequilibrium  (cyclical) 
adjustment  process  rather  than  a  static  equilibrium one.  The  dynamics  arise  from  the  endogeneity 
of  investment  demand  in the  classical  model. 
With  a  stable  system  the  negative  excess  demand  will eventually  rise  so  as  to  ensure  that  e 
=  0  over  time.  This  adjustment  process  will  increase  raise  ac and  therefore  the  growth  rate  and 
level  of  output.  Thus  aggregate  investment  will begin  to  rise.  In  other  words,  even  along  the 
course  of  the  cycle,  the  paradox  of  thrift  effect  will  begin  to  annul  itself  because  of  the  stable 
nature  of  the  short-run  growth  path  and  the  fact  that  circulating  investment  responds  positively  to 
excess  demand  and  negatively  to  debt. 
Over  the  medium-  to  long-run  the  normal  rate  of  profit  and  the  rate  of  savings  out  of 
profits  assert  themselves  to  determine  the  growth  rate  of  output.  Given  the  profit  rate,  a  higher 
savings  rate  will  raise  the  rate  of  accumulation.  If  however,  over  time  this  leads  to  investment  in 
fixed  capital/technological  change  and/or  a  rise  in  wages  that  exceeds  productivity  because  of 
tight  labor  markets,  the  rate  of  profit  will  fdl  (Shaikh,  1987)  and  the  rate  of  accumulation  will 
slow  down.  Thus  the  higher  savings  rate  would  lead  to  an  initial  spurt  in  the  growth  rate  but 
would  eventually  slow  it  down.  In  a  sense,  this  is  the  long-run  analogue  of  the  paradox  of  thrift 
in  the  classical  tradition.  Needless  to  say,  if the  rate  of  profit  falls  then  over  time  the  mass  of 
savings  will  also  decay. 
So  fa  the  discussion  has  taken  place  by  assuming  a  fixed  savings  rate.  However,  if  a  rise 
in  the  budget  deficit  is  accompanied  by  a  rise  in  the  private  savings  rate  (by  the  implementation  of 
policies  that  raise  business  retained  earnings)  then  the  medium  run  growth  rate  would  either 
23 remain  the  same  (i.e.  no  crowding-out  would  occur)  or  it  would  increase  (i.e.  crowding-in  would 
occur).  The  resultant  outcome  would  depend  on  the  movement  of  the  social  savings  rate  s* =  sP 
+  (t  -  g),  as  can  be  seen  from  equation  6. 
Thus,  given  the  rate  of  profit,  the  goal  of  raising  the  medium-run  growth  rate  has  to 
address  attempts  to  boost  business  retained  earnings.  It  therefore  follows  that  the  warranted 
growth  rate  could  be  raised  by  an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  (caused  by  an  increase  in  g  and/or 
a  decrease  in  the  taxation  rate)  which  is  accompanied  by  a  more  than  proportionate  increase  in 
business  retained  earnings  so  that  the  social  savings  rate  rises.  Alternatively,  the  budget  deficit 
could  be  fixed  at  some  socially  desireable  level  while  various  policies  are  used  to  increase  the 
social  savings  rate  by  raising  business  retained  earnings.  This  would  also  increase  the  warranted 
growth  rate.  Business  retained  earnings  could  be  increased  by  investment  tax  credits,  lower  rates 
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Figure  7.  Crowding-In  over  the  Longer  Run 
Fazzari  (1993).  Figure  7  shows  the  above  dynamic. 
24 It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  crowding-in  effect  does  not  occur  because  the  increased 
government  spending  increases  business  profits  (Minsky,  1986)  but  rather  because  the  increase  in 
the  budget  deficit  is  accompanied  by  various  measures  to  increase  the  private  savings  rate  so  that 
the  social  savings  rate  s* =  sP +  (t  -  g)  rises. 
As  discussed  above,  the  rise  in  the  social  savings  rate  can  produce  an  immediate  paradox 
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Figure  8.  The  Effect  of  a  Higher  Social  Savings  Rate  on  the  Cycle: 
the  Possibility  of  a  Paradox  of  Thrift 
of  thrift  effect  in  the  short  run  which,  however,  will tend  to  negate  itself  over  time  (Figure  8). 
Figure  8  plots  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  on  the  cycle  when  the  social  savings 
rate  increases  at  two  different  rates  (sZ*  >  sr*).  That  is,  in the  case  of  s,* the  rise  in  the  budget 
deficit  is  accompanied  by  an  insufficient  increase  in  the  private  savings  rate  so  that  the  result  is  a 
short  run  expansionary  effect  followed  by  crowding-out  in  the  long  run  (basically  the  results 
shown  in  Figures  5  and  6).  On  the  other  hand,  if the  private  savings  rate  rises  robustly  (because 
of  particularly  successful  efforts  to  raise  business  proftability)  so  that  the  social  savings  rate 
increases  strongly  there  is  an  immediate  paradox  of  thtift  followed  by  a  strong  cyclical  expansion 
and  crowding-in  over  the  longer  run  (as  in Figure  7). 
25 The  results  of  Figures  $6,  7,  and  8  underscore  the  enormous  complexity  of  deficit 
spending  and  raise  the  possibility  of  the  choice  of  some  optimal  policies  that  increase  business 
profitability,  provide  cyclical  stimuli  and  raise  the  warranted  growth  rate.  The  key  to  the  longer- 
run  analysis  of  the  effects  of  fiscal  policy  rests  on  the  crucial  role  of  business  profitability.  In  fact 
the  result  shown  in  Figure  7  which  is  obtained  by  a  robust  increase  in  business  retained  earnings 
is  consistent  with  the  empirical  finding  of  Fazzari  (1993)  and  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen 
(1988)  that  retained  earnings  are  crucial  sources  of  finance  of  private  investment.  These  results 
point  to  another  important  difference  between  the  classical  and  neoclassical  models.  In  the  latter, 
the  system  is  driven  by  the  inter-temporal consumption  decisions  of  households  since  business 
profits  are  zero  (McCafferty,  1998;  Godley  and  Shaikh,  1998).  Thus,  unless  household 
consumption  decisions  change,  the  negative  effects  of  deficits  cannot  be  compensated  for  by 
policies  aimed  at  raising  business  profits. 
As  Figure  1 shows,  the  nature  of  the  fiscal  policy  matters  in  the  dynamic  context.  A  one- 
time  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  share  y  =  (g  -  t)  in  a  growth  context  implies  a  gradually 
increasing  value  of  the  budget  deficit  level  (G  -  T).  In  terms  of  Figure  1 this  corresponds  to  the 
equivalence  between  a  &namic  jump  and  static  rise.  The  analysis  of  fiscal  policy  in  the  CGC 
model  is  strictly  speaking  not  comparable  with  the  literature  earlier  most  of  which  studies  the 
impact  of  one-time  increases  in  (G  -  T)  on  a  static  level  of  output.  To  make  an  appropriate 
comparison  with  these  models,  we  need  to  ask  how  they  would  respond  if  (G  -  T)  rises  gradually 
over  time.  The  Keynesian  models  would  eventuahy  reach  fir11  employment,  experience  a  rise  in 
prices  and  a  crowding-out  of  output.  These  would  also  be  the  results  in  the  full  employment 
neoclassical  model. 
The  question  now  becomes,  what  would  be  the  effect  of  a  one-time  increase  in  (G  -  T)  in 
the  CGC  model?  This  would  correspond  to  a  dynamicpdse.  For  this  purpose,  assume  the 
following  function 
38.  (G  -  T)  =  YIP +  ~2 
In  other  words, 
39.  (g-t)=yl  +$ 
26 where  yJP  ->  0  in  a  growing  system. 
The  results  show  that  a  one-time  increase  in  (G  -  T)  caused  by  a jump  in  yz  produces  a 
stimulating  effect  on  the  short-run  growth  rate  and  level  of  output  (Figure  9).  The  short-run 
stimulus  involves  a  rise  in  (g  -  t)  whose  effect  on  the  system  was  discussed  above.  Over  the 
longer-run  (g  -  t)  reverts  to  its  structural  value  given  by  yl.  Figure  10  shows  that  the  above  fiscal 
policy  has  no  effect  on  output  in the  longer-run.  That  is,  there  is  no  crowding-out  because  (g  -  t) 
eventually  reverts  to  its  orignal  value.  Figures  9  and  10  illustrate  a  vital  difference  between  the 
classical  and  neoclassical  models.  In  the  latter,  given  full  employment  output,  there  is  crowding- 
out  in  shares  because  of  the  crowding-out  in  levels.  The  two  situations  are  entirely  equivalent 
because  of  the  static  nature  of  the  neoclassical  model.  The  dynamic  classical  model  shows  that 
the  standard  policy  of  a  one-time  increase  in  G  -  T  produces  a  short-run  positive  effect  on  output 
with  no  long  run  crowding-out  effect. 
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Figure  9.  The  Effect  of  a  Rise  in  G  on  the  Short-Run  Growth  Rate 
27 To  summarize  the  discussion  on  fiscal  policy  in  the  CGC  model,  a  rise  in  the  deficit  share 
(g  -  t)  has  somewhat  different  effects  from  a  rise  in  the  deficit  level  (G  -  T).  Both  can  produce 
crowding-in  of  investment  and  output  as  in  immediate  short-run  effect.  However,  (g  -  t) 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
28tta  Wflfi.  Tine  3xl#6l6NM 
Figure  IO.  The  Effect  of  a  Rise  in  G  on  Output  in  the  Longer  Run 
eventually  crowds  out  output  in  terms  of  its  level  and  its  growth  rate.  On  the  other  hand,  a  one- 
time  increase  in  (G  -  T)  has  no  longer-run  effect  on  the  system  since  the  dynamic  pulse  dies  out. 
One  way  to  interpret  these  results  is  as  follows.  Since  the  dynamic jump  case  in  the  CGC 
model  is  equivalent  to  the  static  rise  in  standard  models  (see  Figure  1  in  which  a  one-time 
increase  in  g  corresponds  to  a  gradually  increasing  G  =  gP),  this  particular  policy  sooner  or  later 
leads  to  negative  effects  in  both  groups  of  models.  In  other  words  in  the  Keynes/Kale&i 
tradition,  given  a  gradually  growing  government  spending  G  the  system  eventually  reaches  full 
capacity  and  till  employment  so  that  “[neo]classical  theory  comes  into  its  own  from  this  point 
onwards,“(Keynes,  1936,  p.  378).  Thus  a  persistent  rise  in  G  in this  tradition  leads  to  inflation 
and  crowding-out.  In  fact  as  Arestis  (1985)  points  out,  Keynes  had  recognized  the  importance  of 
crowding-out  when,  in  discussing  government  spending,  he  stated  that 
2g the  methcd of  financing the  policy and  the  increased working cash  required by the  increased 
employment  and  the  associated  rise  of  prices,  may  have  the  effect  of  increasing  the 
rate  of  interest  and  so  retarding  investment  in  other  directions,  unless  the  monetary 
authority  takes  steps  to  the  contrary  (Keynes,  1936,  p.  119-20). 
In  short,  at  full  capacity/Ml  employment  equations  6-9  apply  along  with  the  crowding-out  result. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  CGC  model  the  system  eventually  reaches  normal  capacity  with 
structural  unemployment  and  crowding-out  (with  a  fixed  savings  rate).  Rather  than  full 
employment  the  medium-run  normal  capacity  utilization  requirement  delimits  the  extent  to  which 
demand  stimulation  can  have  a  positive  effect  on  output.  This  result  is  in  fact  consistent  with  the 
SrafIian  and  classical  inverse  relationship  between  a  higher  wage  share  (leading  to  higher 
consumption  demand)  and  the  uniform  rate  of  profit.  This  inverse  relationship  implicitly assumes 
that  the  system  is  at  the  normal  capacity  level.  If  capacity  utilization  were  not  at  the  normal  level 
then  the  increased  effective  demand  from  the  higher  wages  might  raise  capacity  utilization  more 
than  the  increased  wage-costs  would  lower  the  normal  rate  of  profit  so  that  actual  rate  of  profit 
r  =  r”u would  actually  rise. 
The  above  discussions  should  make  it  clear  that  the  impact  of  budget  deficits  in  a  growth 
context  is  more  complex  than  it  is  in  a  static  model.  While  authors  in  the  Keynes/Kale&i 
tradition  discuss  budget  deficits  both  in  terms  of  levels  and  shares  (Tobin,  1980;  Taylor,  1985; 
Arestis,  1985;  Nell,  1988)  their  static  framework  of  analysis makes  it  impossible  to  investigate 
the  impact  of  deficits  on  the  growth  rate  of  output  as  in  the  above  discussion.  Tobin  (1980)  does 
incorporate  growth  into  his  macro-model,  but  the  impact  of  budget  deficits  on  the  long-run 
growth  path  cannot  be  investigated  since  the  latter  is  determined  exogenously  by  population 
growth  and  technology. 
ii)  i%e Eflects  of  Government  Investment 
The  discussion  so  far  has  abstracted  from  issues  related  to  the  composition  of  government 
spending  and  the  effects  of  different  types  of  public  spending  on  the  warranted  path.  Domar 
(1944)  had  verbally  discussed  the  different  effects  of  unproductive  versus  productive  government 
spending  where  the  latter  is  defined  as  expenditures  on  infrastructure,  education,  public  health 
and  research  and  development  and  all  other  expenditures  which  are  conducive  in  raising  business 
29 productivity.  There  is  now  a  large  and  growing  literature  that  seeks  to  model  the  impact  of 
productive  government  investment  and  finds  a  positive  relationship  between  public  capital  and 
private  investment.  Much  of  this  work  involves  the  neoclassical  and  rational  expectations 
framework  and  is  an  extension  of  the  endogenous  growth  models  of  Romer  (1986),  Lucas 
(1988),  and  Barr-o (1990).  See,  for  example,  the  models  of  Aschauer  (1989a,  1989b,  1998)  and 
Greiner  and  Semmler  (1996).  Some  authors  in  this  literature  utilize  the  production  function 
methodology  in  which  government  investment  is  incorporated  into  the  aggregate  production 
function  (Holtz-Eakin,  1988;  Aschauer,  1989a;  Munnell,  199Oa, 199Ob; Eisner,  1991;  Greiner 
and  Semmler,  1995)  while  others  have  attempted  to  estimate  cost  functions  (Dalenberg  and 
Eberts,  1992;  Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1992; Nadiri  and  Mamuneas,  199 1).  This  latter  approach 
finds  that  public  investment  significantly reduces  business  production  costs. 
The  empirical  link  between  public  investment  and  business  costs  is  a  particularly 
important  one  from  the  standpoint  of  the  CGC  model.  As  shown  in  Moudud  (1998),  the 
warranted  growth  rate  is  a  function  of  the  rate  of  profit.  Thus  if  a  rise  in  public  investment  iG 
reduces  business  costs  and  raises  the  profit  margin  the  warranted  growth  rate  will  increase.  See 
Figure  11. 
The  above  results  are  based  on  the  empirical  finding that  &i/$  >  0  (where  u  is  the  profit 
margin)  and  are  obtained  by  altering  the  composition  of  g  rather  than  a  change  in  its  level. 
Given  its  classical  roots,  the  sensitivity  of  the  warranted  path  in  the  CGC  model  to  profitability  is 
not  surprising  (Dumenil  and  Levy,  1993).  The  purpose  of  Figure  11  is  to  demonstrate  that 
medium-run  crowding-in  from  the  classical  perspective  can  occur  via  the  feedback  effects  of 
government  investment,  production  costs,  and  profitability.  This  effect  is,  however,  due  to  a 
sz+ppZy-side  policy  rather  than  a  demand  injection  one.  In  other  words  if  g  =  C~ +  ig where  ig =  yg 
and  y  is  a  policy  parameter,  a  rise  in the  share  of  ig in  total  government  spending  will  enhance  the 
profit-stimulus  effect  and  raise  the  medium-run  path  of  accumulation.  From  a  policy  standpoint, 
efforts  to  slash  government  spending  to  raise  the  long-run  growth  rate  might  have  the  exact 
opposite  effect  if these  cutbacks  also  involve  cuts  in government  investment  in  infrastructure. 
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Figure  11.  The  Elect  of  t3overnment  Investment  in  Infrastructure 
in  the  Longer  Run 
The  importance  of  infrastructure  was  stressed  by  Joseph  P.  Quinlan  in  a  WaZZ  Street  JournaZ 
editorial  about  the  difficulties faced  by  U.S.  companies  when  they  were  seeking  to  invest  in 
Southeast  Asia: 
To  tap  these  burgeoning  markets,  U.S.  companies  should  carefully  assess  the 
following  strategic  variables:. . . Infrastructure.  Severe  infrastructure  limitations  have 
raised  the  cost  of  operating  in  Asia,  prompting  some  multinationals  to  invest 
elsewhere.  Following  five years  of  strong  growth,  the  physical  infrastructure  of  the 
retion  is  straining  at  the  seams  -  the  roads  are  crowded,  the  ports  are  clogged  and 
the  airports  are  jammed.  Pollution  and  environmental  degradation  compound 
matters.  The  upshot  is  infrastructure  gridlock,  which  threatens  not  only to  strangle 
growth  and  trade,  but  also  to  curtail  new  foreign  investment,”  (Quinlan,  1993,  cited 
from  Erenburg,  1989;  emphasis  added) 
Thus  the  pursuit  of  balanced  budgets  through  cuts  in  government  investment  may  lower 
the  secular  growth  path  of  the  system  and  therefore  have  negative  long-term  effects  on 
employment.  Note  that  this  is  a  possibility  to  the  extent  that  cuts  in  the  budget  deficit  entail  a  fall 
31 in  business  costs  which  is  greater  than  the  concomitant  increase  in  the  social  savings  rate.  The 
net  result  in  the  final  instance  will  depend  on  the  empirical  responsiveness  of  private  investment 
to  public  investment.  The  paper  by  Erenburg  (1993)  on  the  complementarities  between  public 
and  private  investment  is  an  important  empirical  investigation  of  this  issue  for  the  U.S.  economy. 
Finally,  cutbacks  in  infrastructure  investment  might  have  deleterious  effects  on  the  budget 
deficit  itself  as  the  government  raises  outlays  on  welfare  payments  (a  rise  in  C~ )  which  would 
either  maintain  the  deficit  or  might  even  raise  it.  Thus  the  pursuit  of  balanced  budgets  by  cutting 
i* might  be  a  self-defeating  process.  This  is  an  important  point  made  by  Argyrous  (1998)  with 
respect  to  the  Australian  economy. 
Table  1  summarizes  the  study  of  fiscal  policy  in  the  neoclassical,  Keynes/Kale&i,  and 
CGC  models. 
III.  Conclusion 
The  investigation  of  fiscal  policy  in  the  classical  perspective  should  highlight  the 
complexities  and  perhaps  the  ambiguities  that  the  impact  of  government  spending  entails.  In  this 
respect,  the  CGC  model  follows  those  of  Taylor  (1985,  199 1),  Tobin  (1980),  and  Tobin  and 
Buiter  (1980)  which  also  use  a  variety  of  mechanisms  to  derive  crowding-in  and  crowding-out. 
However,  the  mechanisms  involved  in  the  CGC  model  are  very  different  from  those  of  these 
authors  as  is  the  context  in  which  fiscal  policy  is  analyzed.  These  vital  differences  aside,  the 
complexities  in  the  broad  heterodox  tradition  should  be  contrasted  with  neoclassical  analyses  in 
which  budget  deficits  are  at  best  neutral  (Barre,  1974,  1991)  or  harmful  in  both  short-  and  long- 
runs  (McCafferty,  1990). 
A  key  feature  of  the  CGC  model  is  that  the  rate  of  profit,  and  therefore  business  retained 
earnings,  are  a  vital  source  of  long-run  accumulation.  Ceterisparibus,  the  higher  is  the  savings 
rate  from  profits  the  higher  will be  the  warranted  growth  rate.  These  theoretical  results  are 
consistent  with  the  empirical  findings  of  Fazzari  (1993)  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988) 
and  Petersen  (1991)  who  show  that  business  retained  earnings  are  important  for  financing 
investment.  From  a  policy  standpoint,  efforts  to  raise  the  rate  of  profit  by  lowering  costs  or 
attempts  to  boost  business  retained  earnings  will  have  positive  effects  on  the  warranted  growth 
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rate.  As  Fazzari  (1993)  argues  such  policies  include  those  “that  put  more  cash  in  firms’  hands” 
(ibid.,  p.  35)  such  as  investment  tax  credits,  lower  rates  of  corporate  taxation  or  accelerated  tax 
deductions  for  capital  depreciation. 
This  emphasis  on  business  profitability,  which  is  common  to  the  classical  and  the  post- 
Keynesian  traditions,  should  be  contrasted  with  the  neoclassical  macroeconomic  model 
(McCafferty,  1990)  in  which  all business  net  income  is  distributed  to  households,  i.e.  the 
neoclassical  model  rests  on  zero  net  profits.  Thus  in  the  basic  neoclassical  model,  given 
households’  inter-temporal consumption  decisions,  no  other  policy  can  be  used  to  reverse  the 
negative  effect  of  a  budget  deficit.  Apart  from  exhortations  on  households  to  lower  their  alleged 
consumption  binge  (Blecker,  1990),  the  only  policy  is  to  lower  the  deficit  to  raise  investment. 
33 Thus  austerity  is  trumpeted  as  the  only  means  to  achieve  prosperity. 
The  common  denominator  which  is  profitability  in  the  classical  and  post-Keynesian 
tradition  however  conceals  two  important  differences  between  these  two  heterodox  traditions. 
First  as  with  the  post-Keynesian  approach,  in  the  CGC  model  the  short-run  rate  of  profit  is 
determined  by  demand  because  capacity  utilization  is  a  free  variable  in  the  fast  adjustment 
process.  In  the  long-run,  however,  the  normai  rate  of  profit  in  the  classical  tradition  is 
determined  by  income  distribution  and  technology,  whereas  presumably  in  the  Keynes/Kalecki 
tradition  the  rate  of  profit  is  still determined  by  demand  if the  system  is  stuck  with  excess 
capacity  (Taylor,  1985).  Note,  it  would  be  incorrect  to  say  that  “demand”  plays  no  role  in  the 
classical  long-run  position  because  the  normal  rate  of  profit  corresponds  to  the  situation  in  which 
the  system  is  growing  at  a  balanced  growth  rate,  i.e.  along  the  warranted  growth  path.  In  policy 
terms,  in  the  classical  tradition  only  factors  that  lower  business  costs  and/or  increase  retained 
earnings  will  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  warranted  path. 
Second,  unlike  the  Keynes/Kale&i  tradition,  underpinning  the  CGC  model  is  classical 
political  economy’s  distinction  between  productive  and  non-productive  activities  (Eltis,  1993; 
Shaikh  and  Tonak,  1994),  i.e.,  between  those  activities  that  generate  a  surplus  and  those  that 
consume  it.  This  distinction  is  vital  to  an  understanding  of  the  short-run  and  long-run  dynamics 
of  the  model  as  well  as  its  crowding-in  and  crowding-out  results.  While  demand  plays  a  role  in 
the  short-run,  over  the  long  run  if the  share  of  non-productive  activities  (government 
consumption  spending)  increases,  a  smaller  portion  of  the  surplus  will  remain  to  be  re-invested 
and  investment  will  fall.  This  is  a  feature  which  is  implicit to  the  von  Neumann  growth  model 
and  is  also  consistent  with  Walter  Eltis’  seminal work  which  used  the  insights  of  the  classical 
tradition,  especially  those  of  the  Physiocrats,  to  investigate  the  effects  of  government 
expenditure.  However,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  Eltis  has  not  dealt  with  the  complexities 
regarding  fiscal  policy  that  the  CGC  model  has  demonstrated. 
Aside  from  the  differences  in  the  mechanisms  involved,  the  output  responses  in  the  CGC 
model  are  in  some  sense  the  dynamic  analogues  of  those  of  the  Keynes/Kale&i  tradition.  The 
dynamic  specification  shows  that  a  one-step  jump  in  the  share  of  government  spending  g  =  G/P  in 
the  CGC  model  is  equivalent  to  a  gradually  growing  value  of  the  level  of  G  in  static  modeis  (see 
Figure  1).  On  the  other  hand,  the  standard  Keynesian  exercise  of  a  one-step  increase  in  the  level 
34 of  government  spending  G  (Blinder  and  Solow,  1973;  Tobin,  1982;  Tobin  and  Buiter,  1982)  is 
equivalent  to  a  pulse  increase  in  government  spending  whose  magnitude  and  degree  of  impact  on 
output  increases  as  the  initial jump  in  spending  increases.  In  neither  groups  of  models  are  there 
any  long-run  negative  effects  of  this  one-time  increase  in  G.  Thus,  unlike  the  general  equilibrium 
model  in  which  the  system  is  at  continuous  full  employment  (Blanchard  and  Fischer,  1989)  fiscal 
policy  in  both  groups  of  heterodox  models  can  have  substantial  positive  effects  on  output  and 
employment  over  the  course  of  the  cycle  -  positive  effects  that  can  be  amplified  via  expansionary 
monetary  policies.  Given  the  role  of  debt  dynamics  along  the  cycle  in  the  CGC  model,  monetary 
policy  can  also  be  used  to  maintain  a  low  rate  of  interest  by,  for  example,  providing  reserves  on 
demand  to  banks  when  the  latter  require  them  to  bolster  their  balance  sheet  liquidities.  Such 
measures  tend  to  make  the  business  cycle  more  asymmetric  by  making  the  upswing  longer  and 
more  pronounced  and  the  downswing  shorter  and  shallower.  In  other  words,  rather  than  target 
inflation  or  monetary  aggregates  the  purpose  of  monetary  policy  should  be  to  stimulate  growth 
and  employment  (Papadimitriou  and  Wray,  1994). 
Both  the  broad  Keynesian  tradition  (including  the  ISLM  model)  as  well  as  the  classical 
one  conclude  that  only  over  the  longer  run  does  the  system  hit  some  structural  barriers,  although 
the  nature  of  these  is  somewhat  different  in the  two  groups  of  models.  However,  it  is  these 
structural  barriers  that  lead  to  long-run  crowding-out  when  government  spending  rises 
persistently.  As  Keynes  himself recognized  (Keynes,  1936;  Arestis,  1985)  the  persistent  growth 
of  government  spending  would  eventually  lead  to  full  employment,  inflation,  and  crowding-out. 
In  the  CGC  model,  on  the  other  hand,  a  one-time  rise  in  g  (equivalent  to  a  persistent  increase  in 
G  in  a  static  model)  corresponds  over  the  longer  run  to  normal  capacity  utilization  with  the 
persistence  of  structural  unemployment.  The  simultaneous  existence  of  normal  capacity  with 
unemployment  was  formally  demonstrated  by  Goodwin  (1967). 
In  the  Keynesian  tradition,  there  is  scope  even  at  full employment  for  crowding-in  to 
occur.  Following  Currie  (198 1),  Arestis  (1985)  argues  that  even  at  long  run  full  employment  a 
growing  public  sector  might  have  a  positive  effect  on  profitability  and  investment  and  therefore 
shift  the  economy  onto  a  higher  growth  path.  Using  the  quantity  theory  of  money  and  a  multi- 
asset  model,  Tobin  (1980)  shows  that  the  increased  government  expenditure  would  be 
inflationary  and  therefore  make  money  a  less  attractive  asset.  This  would  provoke  an  inflow  of 
35 private  funds  into  other  assets  including  capital  thereby  enhancing  the  economy’s  capital  stock, 
i.e.  crowding-in  occurs  from  the  so-called  Tobin  effect.  Taylor  (1985)  uses  the  same  mechanism 
along  with  the  dynamics  of  inflation  and  income  distribution  to  derive  the  crowding-in  result. 
Crowding-in  over  the  longer  run  in  the  CCC  model  takes  place  under  conditions  of 
structural  unemployment  and  therefore  does  not  occur  via  the  Tobin  effect.  Rather,  it  can  occur 
via  two  different  mechanisms  both  of  involve  the  supply-  rather  than  the  demand-side.  As 
discussed  by  Buiter  (1977),  Currie  (1978),  and  Arestis  (1978)  the  first  one  is  based  on  the 
complementarities  between  public  and  private  investment  since  “. . .public  capital  investment  can 
expand  the  productive  capacity  of  an  area,  both  by  increasing  resources  and  by  enhancing  the 
productivity  of  existing  resources,”  (Munnell,  1992,  p.  19 1).  The  formal  incorporation  of  the 
effect  of  public  investment  in  the  CCC  model  parallels  the  work  along  these  lines  of  Barro 
(1990),  Greiner  and  Semmler  (1996)  and  Aschauer  (1989,  1997a,  1997b).  However,  these  are 
neoclassical/rational  expectations  models  that  assume  continuous  full  employment  at  the  NAIRU 
level.  It  is  this  latter  assumption  that  makes  the  neutrality  or  even  the  super-neutrality of  money 
crucial  to  their  framework  since  the  money  financing  of  productive  government  investment 
would  otherwise  impose  inflationary  costs  (Aschauer,  1998).  Finally, these  authors  model  the 
effect  of  government  investment  by  incorporating  it  into  an  extended  form  of  the  production 
function. 
Structural  unemployment  in  the  CCC  model  is  not  the  NAIRU.  This  and  the  endogeneity 
of  money  imply that  the  neutrality/superneutrality  condition  is  a  meaningless  one  in  this  model. 
Moreover,  the  WC  model  rejects  the  production  tinction  methodology.  Instead  the  impact  of 
public  investment  is  incorporated  by  exploiting  the  empirically-observed  finding that  investment 
in  infrastructure  tends  to  lower  business  costs  (Munnell,  1992).  This,  along  with  the  fact  that  the 
warranted  growth  rate  is  driven  by  the  rate  of  profit  (Moudud,  1998),  enables  us  to  demonstrate 
that  a  shill  in  the  composition  of  government  spending  from  consumption  to  investment  raises 
the  profit  margin  and  therefore  the  long-run  growth  rate  of  the  system.  Provided  that  the  growth 
of  wages  does  not  exceed  productivity  growth,  this  will  also  allow  a  decrease  in  the  long  run  rate 
of  unemployment. 
The  second  mechanism  is  based  on  increasing  the  social  savings  rate  s* =  So +  (t  -  g) 
where  sr, is  business  retained  earnings.  While  an  implication  of  the  CCC  model  is  that  ceteris 
36 paribus  a  rise  in  the  social  savings  rate  would  raise  the  warranted  growth  rate,  this  does  not 
automatically  lead  to  the  policy  of  indiscriminate  deficit  slashing.  Since  sr, is  the  business  retained 
earnings  rate  the  budget  deficit  could  either  be  maintained  or  even  increased  somewhat  as  long  as 
appropriate  policies  are  implemented  to  sufficiently increase  the  retained  earnings  rate,  as 
discussed  above.  In  other  words,  the  policy  of  lower  corporate  taxation  along  with  higher 
deficits  can  be  beneficial  for  medium-run  growth  ifit  is  accompanied  by  a  higher  growth  of 
business  savings  s.  Thus  some  optimal  policy  can  be  designed  in  which  a  rapid  growth  of  the 
business  savings  rate  is  encouraged  along  with  a  stable  or  slowly  rising  deficit  while  the 
composition  of  government  spending  is  changed  to  increase  investment  in  ir&astructure 
(Sterman,  1992).  Such  measures  will  increase  the  social  savings  rate  s* and  raise  business  profit 
margins  by  lowering  business  costs. 
Moreover,  the  presence  of  long-run  structural  unemployment  in  the  CCC  model  opens  up 
the  need  for  active  labor  market  policies  designed  to  achieve  a  higher  rate  of  employment,  a  point 
that  echoes  the  policy  recommendations  of  a  number  of  authors  such  as  Minsky  (1986).  The 
policy  results  of  the  CCC  model  provide  a  macroeconomic  basis  to  the  industrial  competitiveness 
literature  which  has  emphasized  the  various  beneficial  supply-side  effects  of  government  policy. 
Thus,  as  Arestis  and  Sawyer  (1998)  argue,  an  effective  way  to  increase  investment,  growth  and 
employment  is  to  integrate  macroeconomic  policy  with  an  appropriate  industrial  strategy.  In 
other  words,  as  they  point  out,  the  path  to  high  employment  needs  to  take  into  account  both 
demand  and  supply-side  factors.  Provided  that  the  wage  growth  from  the  lower  unemployment 
rate  does  not  exceed  productivity  growth  there  is  clearly  scope  for  both  industrial  policies  as  well 
as  labor  market  ones  such  as,  for  example,  those  discussed  by  Pigeon  and  Wray  (1998). 
To  conclude,  the  blind  pursuit  of  indiscriminate  deficit  cutting  and  tight  monetary  policies 
is  not  to  be  recommended  on  a  variety  of  grounds.  First  in  the  event  of  a  growth  cycle 
downturn,  such  policies  will  do  more  harm  in  the  short  run  without  remedying  the  long-run 
structural  causes  of  the  downturn.  For  one  thing,  they  would  deepen  the  recession  (Minsky, 
1986)  by  slashing  demand.  For  another,  cuts  in  public  investment  may  reduce  future  private 
investment  and  thereby  lower  long  run  growth  (Eisner,  1992; Erenburg,  1993;  Argyrous,  1998). 
Second,  since  it  is  the  rate  of  profit  which  is  the  well-spring  of  the  mass  of  profits,  a  narrow 
policy  of  balanced  budgets  may  be  totally  off  the  mark  if the  system  is  in  the  midst  of  a  long  wave 
37 decline  (van  Duijn,  1983;  Sterman,  1985,  1986;  1992; Kleinknecht,  Mandel,  and  Wallerstein, 
1992;  Dumenil  and  Levy,  1993; Freeman,  1996).  As  Sterman  (1992)  points  out,  attempts  to  cut 
the  deficit  in  a  long  wave  downturn  may  be  a  self-defeating  process.  These  arguments  imply that 
indiscriminate  budget  deficit  cutting  may  exacerbate  poverty  and  inequality  in  both  the  short  and 
the  long  run.  They  also  imply that  in  dealing  with  the  warranted  growth  rate  of  the  system  the 
question  of  raising  its  long-run  rate  of  profit  needs  to  be  addressed  squarely  since  it  is  after  all the 
rate  of  profit  that  generates  the  savings  needed  to  finance  investment.  These  issues  are  of 
particular  significance  for  the  current  world  crisis  with  its  growing  mass  unemployment  and  the 
IMF’s  draconian  austerity  policies. 
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